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The paper assesses the costs and benefits of active international reserve management (IRM), shedding
light on the question of how intense should IRM be for an emerging market. In principle, an active
IRM strategy could lower real exchange rate volatility induced by terms of trade shocks; provide self
insurance against sudden stops; reduce the speed of adjustment of the current account; and even allow
for higher growth if it fosters exports ("mercantilist" motive). The message of the report is mixed --
management of reserves is not a panacea. The mercantilist case for hoarding international reserves,
as an ingredient of an export led growth strategy, is dubious. Done properly, IRM augments macro
economic management in turbulent times, mitigating the impact of external adverse shocks and allowing
for a smoother current account adjustment. These benefits are especially important for commodity
exporting countries, and countries with limited financial development.
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“Several factors, apart from the exchange rate regime, influence the comfort level in regard 
to reserves. Illustratively, they would include vulnerability to the real sector shocks, 
strength of the fiscal and financial sectors, current account balance, the changing 
composition of capital flows, a medium-term view of growth prospects encompassing 
business cycles, etc. In a sense, official reserves have to reflect the balancing and 
comforting factors relative to external assets and liabilities in the context of a rational 
balance sheet approach.” 
 
  Dr. YV Reddy, Governor, Reserve Bank of India / Mumbai Sep 20, 2006 
 
 “…following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s it was likely that countries might choose 
to build up large foreign exchange reserves in order to be able to act as a “do it yourself” 
lender of last resort in US dollars.” 
A speech by Mervyn King, Governor of The Bank of England, New Delhi, 20 February 
2006 
 
  This paper assesses the costs and benefits of active international reserve 
management (IRM).  The first part outlines and appraises various channels where IRM 
may enhance economic performance, focusing on two important channels: i) IRM lowers 
real exchange rate volatility induced by terms of trade shocks; ii) IRM provides self 
insurance against sudden stops and fiscal shocks, reducing the downside risk associated 
with adverse shocks. There is weaker evidence regarding other channels, including iii) A 
mercantilist motive, where IRM is alleged to lead to higher growth induced by fostering 
export; and iv) A greater capacity to smooth overtime adjustment to shocks, thereby 
reducing the speed of adjustment of the current account. 
  Our analysis of international reserve management supplements the insights of 
earlier literature, which focused on using international reserves as a buffer stock, as part 
of the management of an adjustable-peg or managed-floating exchange-rate regime.
1  
While valid, the buffer stock approach fitted better a world with limited financial 
integration, where trade openness determined countries’ vulnerabilities to external 
                                                 
1 Accordingly, optimal reserves balance the macroeconomic adjustment costs incurred in 
the absence of reserves with the opportunity cost of holding reserves (see Frenkel and 
Jovanovic, 1981). The buffer stock model predicts that average reserves depend 
negatively on adjustment costs, on the opportunity cost of reserves, and on exchange rate 
flexibility; and positively on GDP and on reserve volatility driven frequently by the 
underlying volatility of international trade. Overall, the literature of the 1980s supported 
these predictions; see Frenkel (1983), Edwards (1983), and Flood and Marion (2002) for 
a recent review.   2
shocks.   In the absence of reserves, balance of payments deficits would have to be 
corrected via a reduction in aggregate expenditures, imposing adjustment costs.  As 
greater trade openness increases the exposure to trade shocks, minimizing adjustment 
costs requires higher reserve holdings.  The rapid financial integration of developing 
countries, and the financial crises of the 1990s focused attention on the growing exposure 
to sudden stops and on reversals in flows of capital.
2 In such a world, financial markets 
may force an adjustment well before flows of commercial trade would adjust, shifting the 
focus to exposure to financial shocks, and to costs associated with disintermediations 
triggered by adverse liquidity shocks.     
  Section 1 evaluates empirically the impact of international reserves on real 
exchange rate volatility in the presence of terms of trade shocks.  The evidence suggests 
that international reserves play a role in the mitigation of terms of trade (TOT) shocks in 
Developing countries, but not in the OECD.  Economic structure matters greatly – exports 
of natural resources double both the impact of terms of trade shocks on the real exchange 
rate, and that of the mitigation associated with IRM on the real exchange rate.  These 
results are consistent with the notion that the limited development of capital markets in 
developing countries hampers their ability to mitigate the volatility associated with 
shocks.  Section 2 models such a mechanism, explaining possible effects of IRM in the 
presence of costly financial intermediation of long term investment.  Section 3 overviews 
the debate about international reserves management and mercantilist motives, outlining 
the empirical and the theoretical limitations of the mercantilist approach.  The 
mercantilist case for hoarding international reserves, as an ingredient of an export led 
growth strategy, is lacking empirical evidence.  In addition, hoarding international 
reserves motivated by short-run competitiveness concerns of one country may trigger 
other countries into adopting a similar policy, to preempt any competitive advantage 
gained by the first country.  These circumstances may lead to competitive hoarding of 
reserves, which in turn would dissipate any competitiveness gains.  Section 4 evaluates 
the impact of international reserves on current account persistence.  The results support 
the notion that a higher build up of reserves allows countries to be better buffered against 
                                                 
2 See Calvo (1998), Calvo et. al. (2003) and Edwards (2004), and the references therein 
for assessment of sudden stops in developing countries.     3
shocks, thereby reducing the speed of adjustment of the current account.  This outcome is 
consistent with the importance of current account adjustments in allowing for smoother 
consumption, in the presence of limited financial integration and sudden stops.  Section 5 
concludes with a discussion of the limitations of international reserves management.   
 
1. Real exchange rate volatility, terms of trade and international reserves. 
 
In this section we focus on some of the challenges facing a developing country 
with limited development of its internal capital market, a growing integration with the 
global financial system, and a large exposure of the current account to terms of trade 
effects.  This description applies especially to commodity exporting countries, subject to 
large terms of trade shocks.  While favorable terms of trade shocks tend to induce real 
appreciation and capital inflows, the downturns associated with adverse shocks impose 
daunting challenges.  To put this topic in a broader context, note that the literature of the 
1990s identified large adverse effects of exogenous volatility on the GDP and on 
economic growth in developing countries.
3  Fundamentally, this issue hinges on the 
nature of non-linearties affecting the economy, where strong enough concavity may 
generate first order adverse effects of volatility on the GDP and on growth.  An important 
channel that may explain such negative level and growth effects of volatility are 
imperfect capital markets.    
A recent contribution illustrating these considerations is Aghion, Bacchetta, 
Ranciere and Rogoff (2006), who found that real exchange rate volatility reduces growth 
for countries with relatively low levels of financial development.  These studies suggest 
that factors mitigating real exchange rate volatility may be associated with superior 
economic performance.  The large hoarding of international reserves by developing 
countries in recent years raises the question to what extent have these reserves affected 
the volatility of the REER.   For most countries, terms of trade shocks are the most 
important source of exogenous volatility, frequently leading to real exchange rate 
                                                 
3 See Ramey and Ramey (1995) and the references in Aizenman and Pinto for the 
association between macro volatility and growth.  See IDB (1995) and Calderón and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) for the impact of terms of trade shocks and of other foreign 
shocks on growth in Latin America and in developing countries.    4
volatility, potentially magnifying business cycle volatility.  This issue is pertinent for 
developing countries, as they are exposed to TOT volatility, the standard deviation of 
which is 3 times the volatility of industrial countries.  Shallow domestic financial systems 
of relatively small size, and the lack of sectoral diversification in most developing 
countries limit their ability to mitigate TOT shocks by internal adjustment.  Sovereign 
risk and the lack of proper financial instruments inhibit the ability to hedge against these 
shocks by relying on the global financial system [see Caballero (2003) and Caballero and 
Panageas (2003)].  Developing countries may be left with self insurance as a last resort 
option for dealing with TOT shocks.   
In Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2006) we confirm this possibility.  We start by 
applying a rudimentary panel regression methodology, and show that the main result is 
robust to adding controls and to a more sophisticated estimation method.  Specifically, 
the benchmark regression is 
 
(1)  1, 1 2 ln( ) ( *ln( )) ( *ln( )* ) it i it it it REER a TO TOT TO TOT RES α αε =+ + +  
 
where the independent variable is the log of the real effective exchange rate (REER), 
defined so that a higher REER indicates real appreciation.  The term  1,i a  represents 
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  The specification of regression (1) follows the observation that  n * TO TOT  is a first 
order approximation of the income effect associated with terms of trade improvement rate 
of n TOT , where the income effect is defined as the GDP rate of change induced by a TOT 
shock.  Henceforth I refer to  n * TO TOT as the effective terms of trade shock.  By design,   5
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Hence, regression (1) provides information about the degree to which hoarding 
international reserves may impact REER dynamics induced by terms of trade shocks.  
Table 1 reports the regression results for 1970-2004.  Column (1) presents the baseline 
regression pooling all countries, subject to data availability.   The elasticity of the REER 
with respect to the effective terms of trade shock is well above one: a one percent 
improvement of the effective terms of trade induces a REER appreciation of about 1.8 
percent.  International reserves hoarding lessens the elasticity of the REER with respect to 
the TOT by more than twice the International reserves/GDP (i.e., column (1) implies that 
ln( )/[ * ln( )] 1.8[1 2* ] REER TO TOT RES ∂∂ ≅ − ). 
Equation (2) is the elasticity of the REER with respect to the effective TOT, 
implying that the elasticity of the REER exchange rate with respect to the TOT is 
] * 2 1 [ 8 . 1 * ] * [ * ) ln( / ) ln( 2 1 RES TO RES TO TOT REER − ≅ − = ∂ ∂ α α .   Hence, for a 
country with trade openness of 0.25, and IR/GDP ratio of 0.1, the elasticity of the REER 
with respect to the TOT is .25*1.8(1-2*0.1) = 0.36, in line with De Gregorio and Wolf 
(1994), who found that the elasticity of the REER with respect to TOT, unconditional of 
the RES position, is about 0.4.   
Aggregation matters -- columns (2) and (3) show that this result applies to 
developing, but not to Industrial countries.  This is consistent with the notion that limited 
development of the capital market in developing countries hampers their ability to 
mitigate the volatility associated with shocks.  Economic structure matters greatly – 
exports of natural resources magnify the impact of the effective terms of trade shocks and 
the mitigation associated with international reserves by a factor exceeding  2.  
Interestingly, the international reserve effect is insignificant for that group, yet we will 
                                                 
4 Throughout our discussion we presume that trade openness and International 
reserves/GDP are characterized by low volatility relative to TOT volatility.    6
show later that it’s significant for the lagged TOT shock.  In contrast, these interactions 
are insignificant for manufacturing intense countries.  The last two columns focus 
specifically on Latin America and Asia; TOT shocks induce large effects in both blocks.  
International reserves induce a powerful mitigation of the TOT shock in Asian countries, 
but not in LATAM.   
Table 2 verifies the robustness of prior results, redoing the base regression of the 
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The signs are identical to Table 1, the main difference being that shocks are 
apparently absorbed faster in LATAM and Asia, where most of the coefficients on the 
lagged shocks are insignificant for these blocks. 
Table 3 reports country specific results for several Latin American countries.  The 
last two columns of the Individual country table represent the total effect of terms of trade 
changes (amplified by trade openness) into the real exchange rate; taking into account the 
mitigation offered by international reserves:  
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Overall, the results suggest that reserves play a role in the mitigation of TOT shocks only 
in Developing countries.  While this role widely differ across countries, the mitigation 
role of international reserves is important, especially in countries abundant with natural 
resources, like Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico.   
                                                 
5 We rejected the unit root hypothesis for the REER.  We applied a Levin-Lin-Chu panel 
unit root test.  The test assumes that each individual unit in the panel shares the same 
AR(1) coefficient, but allows for individual effects, time effects and possibly a time 
trend. We found high persistence: the autoregressive coefficient of about 0.84, but well 
below 1.     7
The results reported above focus on the association between the level of the terms 
of trade, International reserves/GDP and the real exchange rate.  We also verified that a 
higher International reserves/GDP is associated with a lower REER volatility.   This 
result is consistent with Hviding, Nowak and Ricci (2004), who focused on the 
association of International reserves/GDP and the volatility of the real exchange rate, 
controlling for exchange rate regimes.  Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2006) also 
confirmed that the mitigation effects identified in (2) continue to hold when we control 
for exchange rate regimes, and for the composition of capital flows [see Broda and Tille 
(2003) for the role of exchange rate flexibility in accommodating the adjustment to terms 
of trade shocks]. 
Appendix A outlines a case study of Chile.  Applying OLS and a VAR analysis, 
we find that an improvement in Chile’s terms of trade is associated with a drop of the 
lending and deposit rates, and an improvement of Chile’s external risk evaluation.  We 
turn now to an elaborate model of costly financial intermediation, explaining possible self 
insurance aspects of ex-ante hoarding of international reserves.   
 
2.   The model -- financial intermediation, self insurance and the real exchange rate 
  
A growing literature has identified financial intermediation, in the presence of 
collateral constraints, as a mechanism explaining the hazard associated with credit cycles 
induces by shocks.  The prominent role of bank financing in developing countries 
suggests that capital flights, induced by adverse terms of trade shocks or contagion, 
impose adverse liquidity shocks.  This section outlines a model describing conditions 
under which ex-ante hoarding of international reserves may provide a self insurance 
mechanism that would mitigate the real effects of liquidity shocks, ultimately reducing 
the adverse effects of terms of trade volatility on the GDP.  For simplicity, we focus on an 
ex-ante/ex post model dealing with the determination of the GDP level and the real 
exchange rate during one investment cycle.  Applying the logic of endogenous growth, 
one may extend the model to deal with the impact of terms of trade shocks on growth.    
As our focus is on developing countries, we assume that all financial 
intermediation is done by banks, relying on debt contracts. Specifically, we consider the   8
case where investment in a long-term project should be undertaken prior to the realization 
of liquidity shocks. Hence, shocks may force costly liquidation of earlier investments, 
thereby reducing output. We solve the optimal demand for deposits and international 
reserves by a bank that finances investment in long-term projects. The bank’s financing is 
done using callable deposits, exposing the bank to liquidity risk. Macro liquidity shocks, 
stemming from sudden stops and capital flights, cannot be diversified away.  In these 
circumstances, hoarding reserves saves liquidation costs, potentially leading to large 
welfare gains; gains that hold even if all agents are risk neutral. In this framework, 
deposits and reserves tend to be complements – higher volatility of liquidity shocks will 
increase both the demand for reserves and deposits.  This is another example of hoarding 
international reserves as a self-insurance against non-diversifiable liquidity shocks.
6 
  We model the financial intermediation and the real exchange rate by combining 
Diamond and Dybvig’s (1995) insight with Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee’s (2003) 
modeling of market imperfections in a collateral dependent small open economy.
7  We 
construct a minimal model to explain the self insurance offered by international reserves, 
in mitigating the output effects of liquidity shocks with endogenous real exchange rate 
determination.  Investment in a long term project should be undertaken prior to the 
realization of liquidity shocks.  Hence, the liquidity shock may force costly liquidation of 
the earlier investment, reducing second period output.  We simplify further by assuming 
that there is no separation between the bank and the entrepreneur – the entrepreneur is the 
bank owner, using it to finance the investment. 
We consider a small open economy, where a traded good is produced with capital 
and a country specific non-traded factor.  In addition, the traded sector includes exports of 
commodities, generating revenue which is determined by the realization of terms of trade 
shocks [= the relative price of the exported commodities to other traded goods].  The 
traded good is the numeraire. The relative price of the non-traded factor is denoted by p, 
                                                 
6 See Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992), Aizenman and Marion (2003), Garcia and Soto 
(2004), Aizenman and Lee (2005), Jeanne and Ranciere (2005), and Rodrik (2006) for 
studies dealing with various aspects of self insurance and international reserves.  
 
7 The model extends the one sector framework outlined in Aizenman and Lee (2005).     9
and is referred to as the real exchange rate   There is a continuum of lenders and 
borrowers and their number is normalized to 1.   
We focus now of the evolution of the economy throughout one investment cycle, 
where gestation lags imply that capital should be installed well before hiring specific non-
traded input.  To simplify, the supply of the specific factor is inelastic, at a level Z.  The 
lenders in the economy cannot invest directly, but lend their saving at the international 
interest rate.  Depositors are entitled to a real return of f r on the loan that remains 
deposited for the duration of investment.  The safe return reflects a risk free investment 
opportunity, either in the form of a foreign bond, or as storage technology.  The 
borrowers are entrepreneurs who have investment opportunity, but are credit constrained.  
The actual investment should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks.  








β β − = , 
 
where  1 K  is the non-liquidated capital invested at period 1, z is the level of country-
specific input, hired at a relative price of  1 p .  Premature liquidation of capital is costly, 
and is associated with a proportionate adjustment cost of θ .  Specifically, reducing the 
capital stock by one dollar yields a net liquidity of  ) 1 /( 1 θ + .   
The time line associated with financial intermediation is summarized in Figure 1.  
At the beginning of period 1, the entrepreneur with initial wealth 1 H  , borrows 1 H μ .
8  The 
combined liquidity of  1 ) 1 ( H μ +  finances planned investment 1 K , and setting aside liquid 
reserves 1 R : 
 
(6)  11 1 (1 )HKR μ += + . 
 
                                                 
8 Collateral constraints can be shown to arise due to capital market imperfections in the 
presence of moral hazard and costly monitoring [see Holmstrom and Tirole (1996) and 
Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999)].     10
  Next, a liquidity shock δ realizes. A positive shock is inconsequential, because 
banks can accommodate positive liquidity shocks by purchasing a risk free bond, or 
investing in the risk free low yield storage technology. Hence, we focus our attention on 
adverse liquidity shocks, reducing desirable deposits form 1 H μ  to  ) 1 ( 1 δ μ l H + ,  
0, 0. l δ <>   Our model focuses on the impact of adverse liquidity shocks on optimal 
investment and liquidity, refraining from modeling the reasons for the shock.  Such a 
shock may reflect external developments, like a higher foreign interest rate, contagion, or 
a reaction to a signal revealing the future TOT.  For example, suppose that the public 
learns of a signalδ , determining the second period foreign currency earnings from 
commodity exports.  A negative TOT shock may induce anticipation of an economic 
slowdown, triggering capital flights, and reducing deposits from  1 H μ to 1(1 ) Hl μ δ + .  
Independently of the exact source of the adverse liquidity shock, gestation lags associated 
with tangible investment and costly liquidation, expose the bank to the downside risk 
associated with abrupt adjustment.  
      The bank uses reserves to meet the liquid shock and to purchase the non-traded 
input.  In case of need, the liquidly shock may be met by costly liquidation of capital.  
Consequently, the ultimate capital is: 
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We assume that the liquidity constraint is binding, and that the marginal productivity of 
the non traded input exceeds the return on liquid reserves.  The producer’s surplus is 
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where 1 p  may depend on δ.  
 
   To gain further insight, it is useful to focus on the simplest discrete example, 
where with probability half an adverse liquidity shock of  ε δ − =  (01 ε ≤ < ) would take 
place, and with probability half there would be no liquidity interruption.  The value of ε 
corresponds to the volatility of the liquidity shock, δ.  The asymmetric nature of tangible 
investment implies that only negative liquidity shocks may require real adjustment.  In 
these circumstances, the expected profits are: 
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where  11 KK ≥  
Applying the above, the equilibrium is characterized by the following:  
 
Claim: 
I.  If no liquidation would take place in the bad state ( 11 KK = ), optimal planned 
capital ( 1 K ) is the solution to 
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If liquidation would occur in the bad state ( 11 KK > ), the optimal planned capital 
( 1 K ) is determined by 
 (10b)     
22
1
11 1 1 1 1 1 1
1( 1 )
0
(1 ) [1 (1 )] (1 )
K




μμ ε θ θ
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −−




   (11)    [ ] 11 1 (1 (1 ) (1 ) . Kl H K βμ ε θ θ =+ − + −  
 
II.  The threshold volatility associated with partial liquidation in bad times, denoted 
byε ~, is 



















.   
Hence, small enough leverage and a large enough adjustment cost implies  1 ~ > ε  -- the 
liquidation option would not be exercised.  In these circumstances, the optimal 
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III.  If  1 ~ < ε  , the partial liquidation option would be exercised in bad times only if the 
volatility exceeds the threshold,  1 ~ < < ε ε .   For volatility below the threshold, 
1 ~ < < ε ε , no liquidation would take place, and the equilibrium is characterized by 
(13)-(14). 
 
   13
Proof:  
- The characterization of the planned investment and of the ex-ante hoarding of reserves, 
(13), follows by solving  1 K  from (10a).   
- The optimal stock of capital following partial liquidation, (11), is obtained by 
maximizing the profits in bad times with respect to  1 K  [the second line of (8)], noting 
that 1 K  has been preset at the beginning of the planning horizon.   
- The volatility threshold inducing liquidation in bad times,ε ~, is obtained by noting that 
at ε ε ~ = ,  1 1 K K =  -- at the lowest volatility associated with liquidation in bad times, 
the liquidation is zero.  Solving (11) for the case where 1 1 K K = , we infer 
that 1 1 )] ~ 1 ( 1 [
1
) 1 (









.  The actual level of ε ~ is solved from (10b), 
after substituting both  1 K  and  1 K  with  1 )] ~ 1 ( 1 [
1
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- Smaller leverage and larger adjustment costs imply a higher threshold of volatility 
associated with liquidation [see (12)].  In the no-liquidation range ) ~ ( ε ε > , (13) implies 
that investment drops by half of the anticipated liquidity shock. This drop is financing an 
equal increase in ex-ante hoarding of international reserves.  This hoarding will mitigate 
the effects of adverse liquidity shocks in bad times.  The adverse liquidity shock would 
induce a real depreciation of 
1 lH
Z
εβμ  (see 14).  The extra liquidity induced by hoarding 
reserves, and the real deprecation in bad times allow the economy to adjust fully without 
the need to liquidate tangible capital.  Yet, this comes at the cost of a drop in planned 
investment and output. 
 
- If  1 ~ < ε , we have a mixed regime: for large enough volatility above the threshold,  the 
regime is characterized by a partial liquidation of capital in bad times.  For volatility 
below the threshold, the liquidation option would not be exercised.  Hence, high enough 
volatility induces a regime switch from the non liquidation to the partial liquidation of 
capital.     14
An example of the two regimes is provided in Figure 2, tracing the optimal 
planned investment  1 K  as a function of volatility.  Recalling that 11 1 (1 ) R HK μ = +− , the 
patterns of reserves as a function of volatility, are the mirror image of the patterns of the 
planned investment:  11 // dR d dK d ε ε =−  .  Panel A (B) corresponds to a relatively high 
(low) adjustment cost, θ = 0.2 (θ = 0.02).  For relatively low volatility, liquidation would 
not be exercised, and higher volatility would reduce the planned investment, increasing 
the level of reserves.  These reserves will be used to meet adverse liquidity shocks, saving 
the need to engage in a costly ex-post liquidation of productive investment.  High enough 
volatility implies that the liquidation option would supplement the defensive hoarding of 
reserves.  Note that liquidation mitigates the adverse impact of higher volatility on the 
planned investment, as can be seen by comparing the slopes of the two lines below and 
above the volatility threshold, ε ~.  This mitigation, however, comes at a deadweight loss 
associated with adjustment costs.   
Interestingly, at the regime switch to the partial liquidation regime, we observe a 
discrete drop of the planned investment, and a matching discrete jump in the ex-ante 
hoarding of reserves.   This follows from the observation that the switch to the partial 
liquidation regime increases the marginal valuation of liquid reserves.  The intuition for 
this is straightforward – in the partial liquidation regime, an extra unit of liquid reserves 
saves the need to liquidate 1 θ +  capital, saving the deadweight loss of θ .  This marginal 
benefit of liquidity is absent in the ‘no liquidation’ regime.  Consequently, at the regime 
switch, there is discontinuity where the ex-ante demand for liquidity jumps, inducing a 
drop in planned investment.  This drop increases with the adjustment costs, as is vividly 
illustrated by the contrast between the two panels of Figure 1.  This point can be 
confirmed by comparing (11) and (13a) at the threshold volatility associated with regime 
change.  Denoting the no liquidation (liquidation) regime by NL (LQ), respectively, it can 
be verified that at ε ε =   
 (15) 
2
1 1 1 | |
(1 )
(1 )








A key variable is the adjustment cost parameter, θ, measuring the flexibility of 
capital market adjustment.  Greater flexibility of the adjustment reduces the role of   15
international reserves, and of the overall impact of volatility on investment and on the real 
exchange rate.  
Hoarding reserves mitigates the volatility of the real exchange rate and of the 
adverse effects of liquidity shocks on the GDP.  To fully appreciate this observation, it’s 
useful to evaluate the expected output in the absence of the precautionary adjustment of 
international reserves.  Using the parameters specified in Figure 2a, the planned capital 
is 1 1 = K .  The actual capital in the presence of liquidity shock and the absence of the IR 
precautionary adjustment would have been  ) 1 ( 1 1 1 θ με + − = lH K .  The solid line in 
Figure 3 plots the expected output in this regime as a fraction of the output had the 
liquidity shock been zero.  The bold line is the expected normalized output for the case 
where reserves are adjusted to prevent the need to liquidate capital, as is the case in 
equation (13).  The figure vividly illustrates the first order gain associated with the 
precautionary adjustment of international reserves.  It is easy to verify that the 
precautionary adjustment of reserves also reduces the volatility and the REER.  
The present model is not detailed enough to identify who would hold the 
international reserves – private banks, or the central bank.  In the presence of capital 
controls, like in China, the international reserves would be held by the central bank.  With 
full integration of capital markets and convertibility and an efficient market for excess 
reserves that allows diversifying idiosyncratic shocks, the bulk of the international 
reserves may be held by private banks.  However, moral hazard considerations along the 
line analyzed by Levy Yeyati (2005), or in the absence of an efficient market for 
excessive reserves, international reserves would be held by the central bank.  
The model we described is stylistic – we do not derive the collateral constraint 
endogenously, and we do not claim that the debt contract or the resolution of the liquidity 
shock is the most efficient one.   Taking the debt contract exogenously given, we 
characterize the resultant role of international reserves.
9   See Ranciere, Tornell and 
                                                 
9 We also do not model the mechanism inducing capital flight in the presence of adverse 
terms of trade shocks.  This may reflect both contagion and the possibility of multiple 
equilibrium, or fundamental forces.  For further discussion on “fundamentals based 
Crisis” see Allen and Gale (1998) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997); for panic based see 
Chang and Velasco (1999). 
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Westermann (2003) for a discussion on the dynamic interaction between an unconstrained 
traded sector and a constrained non-traded sector in the presence of liquidity pressure.  
The model suggests that adverse liquidity shocks triggered by terms of trade 
deterioration are accommodated by higher reserves and real depreciation, adjustments 
that limit the needed liquidation of capital.  While our framework dealt with one 
investment cycle, it can be extended into a dynamic set up, where the next cycle 
resembles a similar sequence, subject to updating the entrepreneurs’ initial wealth by the 
profits of the previous investment cycle and by any outside income.  In the extended 
setup, terms of trade improvements (deterioration) would tend to lead to a further real 
exchange rate appreciation (depredation).  This would be the case in circumstances where 
the entrepreneurs’ outside income includes proceeds from the exported commodity, 
implying that higher wealth would increase the future demand for non-traded input.  
Alternatively, this would be the case if the non traded input has other uses, the demand of 
which rises with the wealth of the economy.         
 
 
3.  International reserves management and mercantilist motives 
 
  The discussion in the previous section viewed international reserve management 
in the context of reducing the costs of economic volatility, reflecting the desire for self-
insurance against exposure to future sudden stops. This view faces a well-known 
contender in a modern incarnation of mercantilism: international reserves accumulation 
triggered by concerns about export competitiveness. This explanation has been advanced 
by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003), especially in the context of China. This 
issue is of more than academic importance: the precautionary approach links reserves 
accumulation directly to exposure to sudden stops, capital flight and volatility, whereas 
the mercantilist approach views reserves accumulation as a residual of an industrial 
policy, a policy that may impose negative externalities on other trading partners.  Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau and Garber have interpreted reserves accumulation as a by-product of 
promoting exports, which are needed to create better jobs, thereby absorbing abundant 
labor in traditional sectors, mostly in agriculture. Under this strategy, reserves 
accumulation may facilitate export growth by preventing or slowing appreciation –    17
 
 “we argued that a sensible development policy might involve creating a distortion in 
the real exchange rate in order to bias domestic investment toward export industries. 
Sensible here means that the resulting capital stock will be superior to that generated 
by a badly distorted domestic financial system and other relative price distortions 
typical of emerging market countries.” [Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2005)].   
 
To put this discussion in a boarder context, the mercantilist explanation for 
hoarding international reserves presumes that a monetary policy affecting the level of the 
exchange rate has permanent real effects.  While the view that monetary instability has 
long run adverse real consequences is well supported by empirical studies, there is no 
comparable body of evidence that validates the long run real impact of setting the level of 
the nominal exchange rate.  Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that the neo-classical 
adjustment mechanism works “even” in China – economic growth leads to real 
appreciation independently of the exchange rate regime.      
  The growing importance of foreign direct investment, and the observation that a 
large hoarding of international reserves has occasionally occurred in countries 
experiencing a large foreign direct investment inflow, put to the fore an extended version 
of the “Revived Bretton Woods system,” where international reserves are viewed as a 
collateral reducing the risk associated with FDI:  
 
 “Delivering goods and services up front is a crude form of collateral. But there is no 
credible alternative. Market participants individually could pledge financial assets in 
the center country, but the only way that the aggregate of the periphery can acquire 
assets in the US is to run a current account surplus. In an important sense, the goods 
and services already delivered to the US support the stock of US claims on the 
periphery; it is the collateral that powers the entire development strategy. 
The nature of the social collateral is so obvious it is hard to see. If the center cannot 
seize goods or assets after a default, it has to import the goods and services before the 
default and create a net liability. If the periphery then defaults on its half of the 
implicit contract, the center can simply default on its gross liability and keep the 
collateral. The periphery’s current account surplus provides the collateral to support 
the financial intermediation that is at the heart of Asian development strategies. The 
interest paid on the net position is nothing more than the usual risk free interest paid 
on collateral.” [Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2005)]. 
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  The wide reaching implications of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2005) 
has propagated spirited debate that goes well beyond the scope of our paper.
10  Some 
view the modern mercantilist approach as a valid interpretation for most East Asian 
countries, arguing that they follow similar development strategies. This interpretation is 
intellectually intriguing, yet it remains debatable. Observers have pointed out that high 
export growth is not the new kid on the block -- it is the story of East- Asia during the last 
fifty years. Yet, the large increase in hoarding reserves has happened mostly after 1997. 
Indeed, one may argue that the experience of Japan and Korea suggests that during the 
phase of their rapid growth, the policy tool of choice was selective favorable financing 
targeted sectors, and not hoarding international reserves.
11  In both countries large 
hoarding of international reserves happened after the end of the high growth phase.   
Aizenman and Lee (2005) test the importance of precautionary and mercantilist 
motives in accounting for the hoarding of international reserves by developing countries. 
While variables associated with the mercantilist motive (like lagged export growth and 
deviation from Purchasing Power Parity) are statistically significant, their economic 
importance in accounting for reserve hoarding is close to zero and is dwarfed by other 
variables.  Overall, the empirical results in Aizenman and Lee (2005) are in line with the 
precautionary demand. The effects of financial crises have been localized, increasing 
reserve hoarding in the aftermath of crises mostly in countries located in the affected 
region, but not in other regions. A more liberal capital account regime is found to increase 
the amount of international reserves, in line with the precautionary view. These results, 
however, do not imply that the hoarding of reserves by countries is optimal or efficient. 
Making inferences regarding efficiency would require having a detailed model and much 
more information, including an assessment of the probability and output costs of sudden 
stops, and the opportunity cost of reserves.  
                                                 
10 See Caballero, Farhi and  Gourinchas (2006), Eichengreen (2006a), and the overview 
in Glick and Spiegel (2005). 
 
11 Interestingly, during the period of rapid growth, both Korea and Japan were closed to 
FDI.  Hence, the view that FDI is the key for successful development in East Asia 
remains debatable.    19
Aizenman and Lee (2006) proposes a new interpretation of the association 
between mercantilism, economic growth and hoarding reserves by looking at the 
development strategies of East Asian countries during the second half of the 20
th Century.  
The history of the region suggests the prevalence of export promotion by preferential 
financing, which effectively subsidized investment in targeted sectors.  This was achieved 
in several ways, including direct subsidies funded by state banks; or by means of financial 
repression where favored sectors enjoyed preferential access to cheaper external 
borrowing; or via “moral suasion” where private banks were encouraged to provide 
favorable financing.  We refer to this policy as financial mercantilism, and contrast it 
with monetary mercantilism, a policy that hinges on hoarding international reserves.  
  The history of Japan and Korea suggests the (near) absence of monetary 
mercantilism during the phase of fast growth.  Evidence suggests that financial 
mercantilism had been vigorously applied during the phase of rapid growth.  In both 
countries, the switch to large hoarding of international reserves happened at times of 
collapsing growth.   Thus, if monetary mercantilism played any significant role in these 
countries, it was adopted in periods of disappointing growth. The legacy of financial 
mercantilism led to deteriorating balance sheets of affected banks.  Circumstances where 
floundering growth leads to the switch from financial mercantilism to large hoarding of 
reserves are associated with growing fragility of the banking system -- financial fragility 
is more sustainable in times of rapid growth, but it may induce banking crises when 
growth flounders.
12  In these situations, precautionary motives may lead countries to 
hoard international reserves in order to mitigate the possible transmission of banking 
crisis to currency crisis.  With limited data, such a response may be observationally 
equivalent to the one predicted by monetary mercantilism.  Having good data about 
international reserves but spotty data on non performing loans, it is hard to disentangle 
                                                 
12 The research triggered by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) points out that greater 
financial fragility increases the odds of currency crisis.  Hutchison & Noy (2005) report 
that “… the onsets of 31% of banking crises were accompanied by currency turmoil. 
Furthermore, there is a statistically significant correlation between lagged banking crises 
and contemporaneous currency crises but not vice versa.” This observation is consistent 
with the insight of models of financial fragility, exemplified by Chang and Velasco 
(1999). 
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the precautionary hoarding from the monetary mercantilism.  Moreover, monetary 
mercantilism and precautionary hoarding may be mutually complementary: the 
competitiveness benefit may reduce the effective cost of hoarding reserves and induce 
governments to prefer reserve-hoarding over alternative precautionary means.  
China’s hoarding of reserves picked up sharply after the Asian crisis. Unlike 
Korea and Japan, China is accumulating reserves without having gone through a sharp 
slow-down in economic growth.  We conjecture that the recent history of Japan and 
Korea provided evidence encouraging China to adopt a dual strategy of financial 
mercantilism and rapid hoarding of international reserves.  Arguably, as much as China is 
growing even faster than Korea and Japan in their early years and is going through its 
take-off process in the era of a highly integrated global financial market, China faces 
much greater downside risk of social and political instability associated with a crisis than 
the risk that confronted Korea or Japan.  This greater downside risk of recession and 
financial crisis may explain both the Chinese eagerness to push financial mercantilism, 
and to buffer the downside risk of the growing financial fragility with aggressive reserve 
hoarding.
13  Given the sheer size of China and its reserve hoarding, however, other 
countries in the region may be tempted to engage in competitive hoarding in order to 
mitigate the competitiveness loss in third markets.   
Furthermore, monetary mercantilism is associated with negative externalities akin 
to competitive devaluation. Hoarding international reserves motivated by short-run 
competitiveness concerns of one country may trigger other countries into adopting a 
similar policy, to preempt any competitive advantage gained by the first country.  These 
circumstances may lead to competitive hoarding of reserves, which in turn would 
dissipate any competitiveness gains.  We provide a simple framework illustrating the 
welfare losses associated with competitive hoarding.  These losses may provide a novel 
argument in favor of regional funds, viewed as a mechanism to cope with regional 
                                                 
13 In the case of China, the ratio of banks’ non performing loans/international reserves is 
estimated to be in the range of about 20% (according to the Bank of China) to more than 
90% (see Jim Peterson’s report at the International Herald Tribune, 9-11-2006). These 
numbers indicate a large uncertainty associated with estimating the economy-wide burden 
of financial weakness, which itself would add to the demand for precautionary hoarding.  
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negative externalities.  The greater importance of manufacturing in East Asia relative to 
Latin America, and the deeper financial repression in some East Asian countries suggests 
that the case for Asian fund is stronger than that for a similar regional fund among Latin 
American countries.
14     
 
4.   Current account persistence and international reserves 
 
  The purpose of this section is to ascertain the degree to which higher international 
reserves/GDP ratios have been associated with greater capacity to smooth adjustment to 
shocks overtime, allowing more persistent current account patterns.  In contrast, a low 
level of reserves may require a rigid and fast adjustment of the current account to shocks, 
where deviations from a balanced current account position are hard to sustain.  We 
evaluate this possibility by applying the methodology of Taylor (2002), where the speed 
of adjustment of the current account (CU) back towards its equilibrium or steady state 
level, was captured by the value of β  in the regression
15 



































) 1 ( , β  close to 
minus one implies no persistence of the current account pattern, as would be the case if 
the adjustment to a shock is contemporaneous.  In contrast,  β   closer to zero implies 
greater persistence of the current account, allowing a more protracted adjustment to 
shocks.  
  We start by fitting the following regression: 






















β  , 
                                                 
14 The presumption is that the real exchange rate has greater consequences on the 
competitiveness of manufacturing exporters than on countries specializing in exporting 
commodities and raw materials [for further discussion on regional funds see Eichengreen 
(2006b)].    
 
15 See Taylor (2002) for a discussion linking the above estimation to intertemporal long 
run budget constraints.    22
















, and both the current account balance and 
the domestic economy GDP are measured in current US$.  Table 4 shows the coefficient 
of adjustment and thus a measure of persistence for the current account balance for 1970-
2004, subject to data availability, and subsets of the data such as Developing countries, 
Developed OECD countries, Manufacture exporters, Natural Resource Exporters, Latin 
American and Asian emerging economies. Table 4 also reviews sub samples based on 
1980-1992 and 1993-2004, Indebtedness and Income as classifications given by the 
World Bank.  Note that developing countries are characterized by a faster current account 
adjustment than the OECD, LATAM adjust faster than Asian emerging economies, and 
exporter of natural resource countries adjust faster than the exporters of manufacturing.  
 
 
Cross-section study of the factors affecting the persistence of the current account 
balance 
 
  We turn now to a cross country study testing the impact of international reserves 
on the speed of adjustment.  On average, we expect that a higher build up of reserves 
allows countries to be better buffered against shocks, thereby reducing the speed of 
adjustment of the current account, resulting in a positive association between 
international reserves and β. We apply a two step derivation of the relationship between 
reserves (and other government assets) and current account persistence.  In the first step 
we derive a measure of current account persistence. 
  We ran a time series regression for each available country in the form of: 
 



















This way we obtain one  β coefficient per country. The countries, the number of 
observations used in the autoregressive estimation of their β and the fitted values are 
listed in Tables B1-B4, in Appendix B.  Table 5 provides the estimates for several 
LATAM countries.    23
  The persistence proxy used in the next step is just the value for the pure 
autoregressive process of the current account deflated by GDP:  
 

















 where 1 + = β α .  
In the second step we look at the cross section relationship between our measure of 
persistence represented by α and a series of structural parameters for these economies, 
and a measure of the stock of reserves deflated by the GDP.
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  In the univariate regressions, we find that higher reserves, higher GDP growth and 
a lower share of commodities are associated with a significant increase in the persistency 
of the current account for non OECD countries [see Table 6].   International reserves 
turned out insignificant for a sample inclusive of the OECD countries.  In the multivariate 
regressions we find that for developing countries higher persistence is positively 
associated with a higher IR/GDP, lower inflation, greater flexibility of the exchange rate 
[measured by the volatility of the nominal exchange rate], and a higher share of 
manufacturing [see Table 7]. 
  The results reported above are consistent with the consumption smoothing role of 
current account adjustments.   To illustrate, consider a benchmark neo-classical economy 
where consumption is determined the permanent income hypothesis (linear marginal 
utility of consumption); the output follows an AR(1)  process  1 () tt t YY Y Y Y ρ ε − −= − +  
( 1 ρ <  , output reverting to the long run mean Y at a rate determined by 1 - ρ); and 
where agents can borrow and lend at the real interest r, which also equals their subjective 
rate of time preference.  It can be shown that, around the long run equilibrium,
17  
                                                 
16 Out of 134 countries, there are 10 countries with negative alphas that would represent 
extreme volatility in the current account. These countries are generally small economies 
with very sensitive external sectors. In order to reduce noise in future regressions we 
purge these countries from the data. See the countries in Italics, Table B4, Appendix B.  
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Hence,α ρ   .  Suppose that we modify the above assumptions, adding the possibility of 
sudden stops.  Specifically, assume that the probability of a sudden stop, terminating the 
ability to borrow externally, is Φ; where  (/ ) ;' 0 IR Y Φ =Φ Φ < .   In these circumstances,  
 
 (21)    (1 ) α ρ −Φ  . 
 
This suggests that a negative association between sudden stops and hoarding reserves 
may account for the impact of international reserves on the persistency of current account 
adjustment.  
 
5.   On the limitations of international reserves management 
 
  We close the paper with a discussion of the limitations of international reserves 
management.  While useful, IRM is not a panacea, and is subject to serious limitations 
outlined below. 
 
•  Moral hazard: as with any insurance, there is no way to avoid various layers of 
moral hazard.   
 
- Macro moral hazard: any deep pot of resources may be the target of 
opportunistic raiding by policy makers in regimes characterized by political 
instability and limited monitoring.  Central bank independence helps and is 
desirable, but not sufficient to overcome this obstacle [see Aizenman and Marion 
(2004) for empirical results on the adverse effects of political instability on 
hoarding international reserves].   
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- Micro moral hazard: large stockpiles of reserves may subsidize risk taking, 
especially if it is viewed as a signal of a low probability of exchange rate changes 
[see Levy Yeyati (2005), advocating a combined scheme of decentralized reserves 
in the form of liquid asset requirements on individual banks to limit moral hazard, 
and an ex-ante suspension-of-convertibility clause to reduce self-insurance costs 
while limiting bank losses in the event of a run].   
 
•  Fiscal costs: these costs include a direct opportunity cost (the marginal product of 
investment or the cost of external borrowing), and any marginal costs of 
sterilization [see Calvo (1991) for an early discussion on the quasi costs of 
sterilization].  Hauner (2005) estimated these costs for 100 countries during 1990–
2004, concluding that while most countries made money on their reserves during 
1990–2001, most have been losing money during 2002–04.  One should keep in 
mind, however, the difficulties in tracing the full benefits of hoarding reserves:  
 
“While assessing the fiscal cost of holding reserves, it would be worthwhile to set off the 
benefits that the country may have in holding reserves. In any country risk analysis by the 
rating agencies and other institutions, the level of reserves generally has high weights. 
Moreover, it is essential to keep in view some hidden benefits which could accrue to a country 
holding reserves, which may, inter alia, include: maintaining confidence in monetary and 
exchange rate policies; enhancing the capacity to intervene in foreign exchange markets; 
limiting external vulnerability so as to absorb shocks during times of crisis; providing 
confidence to the markets that external obligations can always be met; and reducing volatility 
in foreign exchange markets. It is true that beyond a point, when the credit rating reaches 
appropriate investment grade, addition to reserves may not lead to further improvement in the 
credit rating. It is necessary to recognize that, as in the case of costs, there are difficulties in 
computing the benefits too.” 
 
Dr. YV Reddy, Governor, Reserve Bank of India / Mumbai Sep 20, 2006 
 
•  Coordination issues: while our focus was on IRM as self insurance, IRM 
management may be part of a fiscal scheme dealing with augmenting social 
security and future pensions.  This is especially relevant for countries exporting 
commodities, like Chile, Norway, etc.  This suggests the need to delegate the 
management of these funds to two different agencies.  One, like the central bank, 
should deal with IRM as part of prudent macroeconomoic management   26
throughout the business cycle.  The second fund fits more the treasury, or the 
social security administration, as it deals with long term intergenerational transfer.  
For further discussion, see Davis et. al. (2001). 
To conclude, this paper outlined several motives for hoarding international reserves in the 
era of growing financial integration.  The message of the report is mixed –management of 
reserves is not a panacea.  The mercantilist case for hoarding international reserves, as an 
ingredient of an export led growth strategy, is dubious.  Done properly, international 
reserve management reduces the downside risk in turbulent times.  These benefits are 
especially important for commodity exporting countries; and countries with limited 
financial development.         27
Appendix A 
Financial Transmission of Terms of Trade Shocks in Natural Resource 
Economies – The case of Chile 
 
Meta Data and Definitions 
-The frequency of the data is quarterly 
-Sources: IFS, DataStream, CEIC, WEO, ICRG 
-Gap Variables are obtained by detrending the variables. The trend is calculated 
using the Hodrick/Prescott filter with lambda set to 1600 (recommended value for 
quarterly data). 
-Log differences are use as proxy for percentage growth 
 
Monetary Aggregates: 
-MB equals Monetary Base 
 
-M1 equals currency in circulation plus demand deposits in checking accounts of 
the nonfinancial private sector net of float, demand deposits other than those in 
checking accounts and demand savings deposits. 
 
-M2 encompasses M1 plus time deposits of the private sector, plus time saving 
deposits, plus mutual funds (FM) quotas in up to one-year instruments (non 
financial private sector) and plus deposits of Saving and Credit Cooperatives 
(CAC), less FM investments in M2 and less CAC investments in M2. 
 
-M3 corresponds to M2 plus foreign exchange deposits of the private sector, plus 
instruments of the Central Bank, plus Treasury bonds, plus credit bills, plus other 
Mutual Funds (FM) quotas, plus AFP voluntary saving quotas, less FM 
investments in M3 and less AFP investments in M3. 
-Private Credit: We define private credit as M3-M1 
-Reserves: Comprise special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by 




-Deposit Rates: rates offered to resident customers for demand, time, or savings 
deposits.  
-Lending Rates: bank rate that usually meets the short- and medium-term 
financing needs of the private sector. This rate is normally differentiated 
according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. 
-Domestic Spread (DS): We define the Domestic Spread (DS) as the difference 
between the Lending Rate and the Deposit Rate.  
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Terms of Trade: As usual, TOT is calculated as the ratio of export to import price 
indexes. 
 
Real Output:   






External Perception of Country Specific Risks:  
-Economic Risk:  A means of assessing a country's current economic strengths 
and weaknesses. In general, where strengths outweigh weaknesses, a country will 
show low risk and where weaknesses outweigh strengths, the economic risk will 
be high. To ensure comparability between countries, risk components are based on 
accepted ratios between the measured data within the national economic/financial 
structure, and then the ratios are compared, not the data. Risk points are assessed 
for each of the component factors of GDP per head of population, real annual 
GDP growth, annual inflation rate, budget balance as a percentage of GDP, and 
current account balance as a percentage of GDP. Risk ratings range from a high of 
50 (least risk) to a low of 0 (highest risk), though lowest de facto ratings are 
generally near 15. 
-Financial Risk Rating: A means of assessing a country's ability to pay its way 
by financing its official, commercial and trade debt obligations. To ensure 
comparability between countries, risk components are based on accepted ratios 
between the measured data within the national economic/financial structure, and 
then the ratios are compared, not the data. Risk points are assessed for each of the 
component factors of foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as 
a percentage of exports of goods and services (XGS), current account as a 
percentage of XGS, net liquidity as months of import cover, and exchange rate 
stability. Risk ratings range from a high of 50 (least risk) to a low of 0 (highest 





Single OLS Equation: Effects of TOT into Financial Variables 
 
The OLS indicates that an improvement in the TOT is associated with: 
•  A drop of the financial spread = [lending rates - deposit rates] 
•  Improvement in Chile’s financial and economic risk assessment. 
•  A positive gap between both the Real Output and the Real Demand and 
their long run trend. 
•  Higher growth rate of M1. 











Table A1: Single OLS Equation; Effects of TOT into Financial Variables 
TOT, MB, M1, M2, M3, Econ Risk, and Financial Risk variables are represented in log differences proxy for the growth rates. 
Real GDP and Real Demand represent the deviations from their long run trend. 

























TOT  0.012  0.042*** 0.012 0.09 -0.041  -0.167  -0.054  -15.732** -22.39 -24.001  0.258  0.353**  -0.256** 
  [0.056]  [0.014]  [0.133] [0.127] [0.086] [0.104]  [0.223]  [7.802]  [26.380]  [28.146]  [0.166]  [0.171]  [0.121] 
TOT L1  0.06  0.034** 0.054  0.255* 0.016 -0.141  0.024  -17.945** -13.047  -16.99 0.258  0.197  -0.396*** 
  [0.075]  [0.013]  [0.129] [0.141] [0.085] [0.108]  [0.254]  [7.331]  [23.559]  [25.365]  [0.189]  [0.179]  [0.118] 
TOT L2  0.135 0.015 0.094  0.268* 0.086 -0.095  0.041  -16.473** 7.781  7.639  0.124 0.041 -0.363*** 
  [0.081]  [0.012]  [0.134] [0.157] [0.091] [0.117]  [0.287]  [7.477]  [27.996]  [29.899]  [0.194]  [0.146]  [0.115] 
TOT L3  0.151*  0.001  0.173 -0.137 0.123 0.038  -0.209  -0.523  45.655  52.223  0.055  -0.191  0.175 
  [0.082]  [0.015]  [0.140] [0.190] [0.098] [0.142]  [0.303]  [10.676]  [46.595]  [47.505]  [0.219]  [0.203]  [0.179] 
TOT L4  0.196**  0.003  0.183 0.123 0.144 -0.016  -0.037  -9.387  33.737  38.591  0.013  -0.081  -0.138 
  [0.077]  [0.012]  [0.150] [0.192] [0.096] [0.130]  [0.299]  [9.490]  [39.113]  [41.211]  [0.227]  [0.164]  [0.170] 








 Where  t Π = {Real Demand Gap, Lending Rate, Deposit Rate 










Rate  M1  PRIVATE 
CREDIT 
ECON 
RISK  TOT 
TOT(-1)  2.206** -0.775**  -0.761** 0.37*  -0.386*  0.76**  1.39*** 
  -1.005 -0.359  -0.375  -0.213 -0.215  -0.336  -0.09 
TOT(-2)  -3.7*** 0.106 0.083  0.131  -0.091 -0.487  -0.819*** 
 -1.126  -0.402  -0.42  -0.239 -0.24  -0.377 -0.101 
C  -0.112* 0.003 0.016  -0.011 0.005 -0.014 0.009 
  0.061 0.022  0.023  0.013  0.013 0.021 0.005 
R-squared  0.966 0.816  0.845  0.454  0.377  0.29 0.858 
Adj. R-squared  0.958 0.776  0.811  0.334  0.241 0.134 0.828 
Sum sq. resids  1.085 0.138  0.151  0.049  0.049 0.121 0.009 
S.E. equation  0.13 0.046  0.049  0.028  0.028  0.044  0.012 
F-statistic  129.526 20.304 24.984 3.797  2.772  1.864  27.73 
Log likelihood  57.273 138.707  135.245  179.779 179.279  143.795  248.153 
AIC  -1.07 -3.132  -3.044  -4.172 -4.159  -3.261 -5.903 
Schwarz SC  -0.62 -2.682  -2.594  -3.722 -3.709  -2.811 -5.453 
 
Table A2: VAR analysis on the effects of terms of trade shocks 
 
Table 2 Reports the effects of terms of trade shocks (measured as changes in the TOT growth 
rates) on the different key macro variables of the Chilean economy given by a second order 
vector autoregressive equation (the remaining coefficients are not reported here). 
 
We chose two lags for our VAR following the Schwarz and the Hannan-Quinn criterions 
 
Lag LogL  LR  FPE AIC  SC  HQ 
0 911.528 0  5.70E-20  -24.447  -24.229  -24.36 
1 1176.146  472.022  1.69E-22  -30.274  -28.531  -29.579 
2 1293.722  187.486  2.74E-23  -32.128 -28.858* -30.823* 
3  1342.764 68.924 2.99E-23 -32.129 -27.334 -30.216 
4 1421.307  95.525*  1.61E-23  -32.927  -26.607  -30.406 
5  1482.338 62.681 1.60E-23 -33.252 -25.406 -30.122 
6 1556.53  62.161  1.38e-23*  -33.933 -24.561 -30.195 
7 1634.354  50.48  1.52E-23  -34.712*  -23.815  -30.365 
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The VAR analysis shows properties similar to the ones uncovered by the OLS approach; a 
positive shock to the growth rate of TOT is associated with: 
•  A drop in the same order of magnitude of both the lending and the deposit rate. The 
negative impact is slightly bigger in the lending rate which may help explain the negative 
coefficient of the domestic spread in the single OLS equation. 
•  Improvement in Chile’s external risk evaluation. 
•  Higher growth rate of M1, and lower growth rate of private credit (M3-M1). 
•  Higher real aggregate demand. The initial positive effect is then quickly reversed after 
the first lag. 
 
Table A4 reports the variance decomposition of the previous VAR. The analysis shows that 
changes in the growth rate of TOT absorb a significant variance from variables like the real 
aggregate demand, deposits and lending rates, money supply growth and private credit. For this 
decomposition we assume TOT to be the most exogenous measure so we place this variable last 
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Variance Decomposition of Real Demand:               
Period  Real Demand  Deposit  Lending  M1  Priv Credit  Econ Risk  TOT 
1 100             
2 97.35  0.3  1.12  0.01  0.05  0.39  0.78 
3 95.63  0.17  2.28  0.3  0.03  0.43  1.16 
4 93.73  0.15  3.98  0.83  0.03  0.46  0.83 
5 90.81  0.2  5.88  1.45  0.08  0.57  1.01 
6 86  0.23  7.86  1.91  0.31  0.7  2.99 
7 79.93  0.21  9.63  2.06  0.78  0.81  6.59 
8 74.23  0.37  11.05  1.96  1.41  0.87  10.11 
9 70.06  0.94  12.1  1.87  1.95  0.92  12.16 
10  67.46  1.88  12.78  1.98  2.22  0.99  12.67 
 Variance Decomposition of Deposit Rates:         
1 4.95  95.05           
2 4.65  88.99  1.05  0.73  1.56  0.32  2.71 
3 4.62  81.44  1.53  1.02  3.6  0.57  7.21 
4 4.52  76.36  1.45  2.64  4.57  0.48  9.98 
5  4.81  72.4  2.57  3.46  5.12  0.44  11.2 
6 5.37  69.96  4.08  3.9  5.8  0.4  10.49 
7 5.86  67.68  5.71  4.2  6.59  0.4  9.56 
8 6.05  65.27  7.32  4.4  7.72  0.46  8.77 
9 5.95  63.1  8.56  4.71  8.96  0.55  8.18 
10 5.71  61.14  9.51  5.12  10.1  0.62  7.8 
 Variance Decomposition of Lending Rates:         
1 5.09  91.93  2.98         
2 4.59  87.58  2.49  0.79  1.77  0.54  2.23 
3 4.51  79.18  3.73  0.89  3.92  1.2  6.57 
4 4.47  74.26  3.58  2.32  5.25  1.04  9.09 
5  4.87  69.93  4.83  3.22  5.89  0.96  10.28 
6 5.66  67.01  6.48  3.72  6.62  0.88  9.63 
7 6.43  64.41  8.17  4.09  7.37  0.84  8.7 
8 6.86  61.76  9.83  4.34  8.41  0.88  7.92 
9 6.91  59.46  11.13  4.68  9.54  0.94  7.34 
10 6.7  57.46  12.14  5.13  10.59  1.01  6.98 
 Variance Decomposition of M1:           
1 9.8  48.04  1.27  40.88       
2 8.38  41.49  3.98  39.24  0.13  4.96  1.82 
3 7.42  37.18  3.49  37.09  0.18  8.67  5.96 
4 7.41  35.8  4.13  35.5  0.36  8.3  8.49 
5 7.3  35.64  4.06  33.96  1.54  8.26  9.23 
6 7.2  35.21  4.01  33.74  2.48  8.26  9.1 
7 7.12  34.57  3.95  33.63  3.06  8.12  9.55 
8 7.04  33.99  3.89  33.54  3.18  7.98  10.38 
9  6.96  33.81  3.93  33.42  3.19  7.9  10.79 
10 6.97  34  4.1  33.18  3.2  7.83  10.72 
 Variance Decomposition of Private Credit:         
1 9.4  56.17  1.62  24.23  8.58     
2 8.67  53.24  3.19  21.11  9.28  2.53  1.99 
3 7.75  47.48  3.11  19.09  9.23  6.53  6.8 
4 7.42  45.79  2.98  19.08  9.21  6.24  9.29 
5 7.26  44.71  3.05  19.38  8.99  6.42  10.19 
6 7.4  44.49  3.65  19.17  8.86  6.38  10.05 
7 7.6  44.4  4.12  18.76  8.69  6.25  10.18 
8 7.63  44.01  4.54  18.41  8.75  6.18  10.47 
9  7.56  43.72  4.76  18.22  9.05  6.19  10.51 
10 7.55  43.46  4.84  18.18  9.33  6.2  10.45 
 Variance Decomposition of Econ risk:         
1 0.43  0.86  2.38  5.76  0.87  89.7   
2 0.46  1.39  2.2  6.02  3.8  82.74  3.39 
3 0.84  4.47  2.01  10.12  3.62  75.13  3.82 
4 0.91  5.32  2.08  10.34  3.65  73.93  3.78 
5 0.91  5.48  2.07  10.32  3.68  73.76  3.78 
6 0.91  5.48  2.07  10.34  3.74  73.68  3.78 
7 0.93  5.48  2.07  10.39  3.8  73.56  3.78 
8 0.95  5.48  2.07  10.44  3.84  73.45  3.77 
9 0.99  5.5  2.08  10.45  3.86  73.35  3.77 
10 1.02  5.52  2.11  10.47  3.88  73.25  3.76 
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Left scale is the index number for TOT (Export Price Index/ Import Price Index. Seasonally 
adjusted); right scale is the Growth rate of TOT (proxied by DLTOT).      
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Appendix B:     Data definitions and tables 
 
 “Manufactures”: 
Average of annual observations of the percentage of economic activity dedicated to the 
production of manufactures (measured as percentage of the GDP), following the definition given 
by the United Nations, Manufactures comprises  pf the tabulation category D and divisions 15-
37 in the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Revision 3. 
It is defined as the physical or chemical transformation of materials or components into new 
products, whether the work is performed by power-driven machines or by hand, whether it is 
done in a factory or in the worker's home, and whether the products are sold as wholesale or 




Average of annual observations of the percentage of economic activity dedicated to the 
production of agricultural products, mining, hunting, and utilities. 
 
“Reserves”: 
Average of annual observations of the Stock of Reserves over GDP taken during the sample 
period. The sample period depends on data availability. 
 
“NE Volatility”: 
Nominal exchange rate volatility is the average annual volatility. Each annual observation 
corresponds to the percent standard deviation of the monthly nominal rate of the domestic 

















Average of annual observations of Edward’s measure of financial integration (see Capital 
Mobility and Economic Performance:  Are Emerging Countries Different? ) 
“Inflation” 
Average of annual CPI inflation observations 
“Terms of Trade”: 
Average of annual observations of the terms of trade defined as the ratio of the export price 
index to the corresponding import price index, measured relative to the base year 2000.   39
Table B1: Indebtedness Ranking 
1 = Severely Indebted  2 = Moderately Indebted  3 = Less Indebted 
Angola Benin  Albania 
Argentina Bolivia  Algeria 
Belize Burkina  Faso  Armenia 
Brazil Cambodia  Azerbaijan 
Bulgaria Cameroon  Bangladesh 
Burundi Cape  Verde  Barbados 
Central African Rep.  Chile  Belarus 
Chad  Colombia  Bosnia & Herzegovina 
Comoros El  Salvador  Botswana 
Congo, Republic of  Ethiopia  China 
Côte d'Ivoire  Honduras  Costa Rica 
Croatia Hungary  Czech  Republic 
Dominica Jamaica  Djibouti 
Ecuador Kenya  Dominican  Republic 
Eritrea Lithuania  Egypt 
Estonia Madagascar  Equatorial  Guinea 
Gabon Malaysia  Fiji 
Gambia, The  Mauritania  Georgia 
Grenada Mauritius  Ghana 
Guinea Moldova  Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau Mongolia  Haiti 
Guyana Niger  India 
Indonesia  Nigeria  Iran, I.R. of 
Jordan Pakistan  Lesotho 
Kazakhstan  Papua New Guinea  Macedonia, FYR 
Kyrgyz Republic  Paraguay  Maldives 
Lao People's Dem.Rep  Philippines  Mali 
Latvia Poland  Mexico 
Liberia Russia  Morocco 
Malawi Slovak  Republic  Mozambique 
Myanmar Solomon  Islands  Namibia 
Panama Sri  Lanka  Nicaragua 
Peru St.  Lucia  Oman 
Rwanda  St. Vincent & Grens.  Romania 
Samoa Tunisia  Senegal 
São Tomé & Príncipe  Turkmenistan  South Africa 
Seychelles Uganda  Swaziland 
Sierra Leone  Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  Tanzania 
Somalia   Thailand 
St. Kitts and Nevis    Tonga 
Sudan    Trinidad and Tobago 
Syrian Arab Republic    Ukraine 
Tajikistan   Vanuatu 
Togo   Vietnam 
Turkey    Yemen, Republic of 
Uruguay    
Zambia      40
 
 
Table B2: Income Level 
1=Low Income  2=Lower-Middle Income  3=Upper-Middle Income  4=High Income 
Afghanistan, I.S. of  Albania  Antigua and Barbuda  Aruba 
Bangladesh Algeria  Argentina  Australia 
Benin Angola  Barbados  Austria 
Burkina Faso  Armenia  Belize  Bahamas, The 
Burundi  Azerbaijan  Botswana  Bahrain, Kingdom of 
Cambodia Belarus  Chile  Belgium 
Cameroon Bolivia  Costa  Rica  Canada 
Central African Rep.  Bosnia & Herzegovina  Croatia  Hong Kong 
Chad Brazil Czech  Republic  Macao 
Comoros Bulgaria  Dominica  Cyprus 
Congo, Republic of  Cape Verde  Equatorial Guinea  Denmark 
Côte d'Ivoire  China  Estonia  Faroe Islands 
Eritrea Colombia  Gabon  Finland 
Ethiopia Djibouti  Grenada  France 
Gambia, The  Dominican Republic  Hungary  Germany 
Ghana Ecuador  Latvia  Iceland 
Guinea Egypt  Libya  Ireland 
Guinea-Bissau El  Salvador  Lithuania  Israel 
Haiti Fiji  Malaysia  Italy 
India Georgia  Mauritius  Japan 
Kenya Guatemala  Mexico  Kuwait 
Korea Guyana  Oman  Luxembourg 
Kyrgyz Republic  Honduras  Panama  Malta 
Lao People's Dem.Rep  Indonesia  Poland  Netherlands 
Lesotho  Iran, I.R. of  Russia  Netherlands Antilles 
Liberia Iraq  Seychelles  New  Zealand 
Madagascar Jamaica  Slovak  Republic  Norway 
Malawi Jordan  South  Africa  Portugal 
Mali  Kazakhstan  St. Kitts and Nevis  Saudi Arabia 
Mauritania  Macedonia, FYR  St. Lucia  Singapore 
Moldova  Maldives  St. Vincent & Grens.  Slovenia 
Mongolia  Morocco  Trinidad and Tobago  Spain 
Mozambique Namibia  Turkey  Sweden 
Myanmar Paraguay Uruguay  Switzerland 
Nepal  Peru  Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  United Kingdom 
Nicaragua Philippines   United  States 
Niger Romania     
Nigeria Samoa    
Pakistan Sri  Lanka     
Papua New Guinea  Suriname     
Rwanda Swaziland     
São Tomé & Príncipe  Syrian Arab Republic     
Senegal Thailand    
Sierra Leone  Tonga     
Solomon Islands  Tunisia     
Somalia Turkmenistan     
Sudan Ukraine     
Tajikistan Vanuatu     
Tanzania  West Bank and Gaza     
Togo      
Uganda      
Vietnam      
Yemen, Republic of     
Zambia        41
Table B3: Data Availability for each country 
 
country  start end  country  start end  country  start end 
Afghanistan, I.S. of  1979  1981  Gambia, The  1978  1997  Nigeria  1977  2004 
Albania  1984 2003  Georgia  1997 2004  Norway  1970 2004 
Algeria  1970 1997  Germany  1971 2004  Oman  1974 2003 
Angola  1985 2004  Ghana  1975 2004  Pakistan  1970 2004 
Antigua and Barbuda  1977  2002  Grenada  1977  2002  Panama  1977  2004 
Argentina  1970 2004  Guatemala  1970 2004  Papua  New  Guinea  1976 2001 
Armenia  1993 2004  Guinea  1986 2004  Paraguay  1970 2004 
Aruba  1991 2002  Guinea-Bissau  1982 1997  Peru  1970 2004 
Australia  1970 2004  Guinea-Bissau  2001 2003  Philippines  1970 2004 
Austria  1970 2004  Guyana  1977 1985  Poland  1985 2004 
Bahamas,  The  1976 2003  Guyana  1992 2004  Portugal  1972 2004 
Bahrain, Kingdom of  1980  2003  Haiti  1971  2003  Romania  1987  2004 
Bangladesh  1976 2004  Honduras  1974 2004  Russia  1994 2004 
Barbados  1970 2003  Hungary  1982 2004  Rwanda  1976 2004 
Belarus  1993 2004  Iceland  1970 2004  Samoa  1978 1999 
Belgium  2002  2004  India  1970  2003  São Tomé & Príncipe  1974  1990 
Belize  1984  2004  Indonesia  1970  2004  São Tomé & Príncipe  1998  2002 
Benin  1974  2003  Iran, I.R. of  1976  1990  Saudi Arabia  1970  2004 
Bolivia  1970  2004  Iran, I.R. of  1993  2000  Senegal  1974  2003 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  1998  2004  Iraq  1976  1977  Seychelles  1976  2004 
Botswana  1975 2003  Ireland  1970 2004  Sierra  Leone  1977 2004 
Brazil  1970 2004  Israel  1970 2004  Singapore  1970 2004 
Bulgaria  1980 2004  Italy  1970 2004  Slovak  Republic  1993 2000 
Burkina  Faso  1974 1994  Jamaica  1970 2004  Slovak  Republic  2002 2003 
Burkina  Faso  2000 2001  Japan  1970 2004  Slovenia  1992 2004 
Burundi  1985 2003  Jordan  1970 2004  Solomon  Islands  1975 1999 
Cambodia  1992 2004  Kazakhstan  1995 2004  Somalia  1977 1989 
Cameroon  1977 1995  Kenya  1975 2004  South  Africa  1970 2004 
Canada  1970 2004  Korea  1970 2004  Spain  1970 2004 
Cape  Verde  1986 2003  Kuwait  1975 2003  Sri  Lanka  1970 2004 
Central African Rep.  1977  1994  Kyrgyz Republic  1993  2004  St. Kitts and Nevis  1980  2002 
Chad  1977  1994  Lao People's Dem.Rep  1984  2001  St. Lucia  1979  2002 
Chile  1970  2004  Latvia  1992  2004  St. Vincent & Grens.  1978  2002 
China  1982 2004  Lesotho  1975 2004  Sudan  1977 2004 
Hong  Kong  1998 2004  Liberia  1979 1987  Suriname  1977 2004 
Macao  2002 2002  Libya  1977 1987  Swaziland  1974 2004 
Colombia  1970 2004  Libya  1990 2004  Sweden  1970 2004 
Comoros  1980 1995  Lithuania  1993 2004  Switzerland  1970 2004 
Congo, Republic of  1978  2003  Luxembourg  1995  2004  Syrian Arab Republic  1970  2004 
Costa Rica  1970  2004  Macedonia, FYR  1996  2004  Tajikistan  2002  2004 
Côte  d'Ivoire  1970 2004  Madagascar  1974 2003  Tanzania  1988 2004 
Croatia  1993 2004  Malawi  1977 2002  Thailand  1970 2004 
Cyprus  1976 2004  Malaysia  1970 2003  Togo  1974 2003 
Czech  Republic  1993 2004  Maldives  1980 2004  Tonga  1975 1993 
Denmark  1970 2004  Mali  1975 2003  Tonga  2001 2002 
Djibouti  1992 1995  Malta  1971 2004  Trinidad  and  Tobago  1970 2003 
Dominica  1977 2002  Mauritania  1975 1998  Tunisia  1970 2004 
Dominican  Republic  1970 2004  Mauritius  1980 2004  Turkey  1970 2004 
Ecuador  1970 2004  Mexico  1970 2004  Turkmenistan  1996 1997 
Egypt  1970 2004  Moldova  1994 2004  Uganda  1980 2004 
El  Salvador  1970 2004  Mongolia  1993 2004  Ukraine  1994 2004 
Equatorial  Guinea  1987 1996  Morocco  1970 2004  United  Kingdom  1970 2004 
Eritrea  1992 2000  Mozambique  1980 2004  United  States  1970 2004 
Estonia  1992 2004  Namibia  1990 2004  Uruguay  1970 2004 
Ethiopia  1981 2004  Nepal  1976 2004  Vanuatu  1982 2003 
Euro  Area  1998 2004  Netherlands  1970 2004  Venezuela,  Rep.  Bol. 1970 2004 
Fiji  1979 1999  Netherlands  Antilles  1980 1985  Vietnam  1996 2002 
Finland  1970  2004  New Zealand  1970  2004  Yemen, Republic of  1990  2004 
France  1970 2004  Nicaragua  1977 2004  Zambia  1978 1991 
Gabon  1978 2003  Niger  1974 2003  Zambia  1997 2000 
   42
Table B4: Estimated β for each country* 
 




squared  Name Beta  SE 
Ye
ars  R-squared 
Albania  -0.864 [0.170]***  19  0.4337 Kazakhstan  -1.036 [0.45]*  9  0.4668
Algeria  -0.499 [0.196]**  27  0.2159 Kenya  -0.597 [0.18]***  29  0.3039
Angola  -1.018 [0.192]***  19  0.5085 Korea  -0.336 [0.1]***  34  0.1715
Antigua and Barb.  -0.531 [0.169]***  25  0.2654 Kuwait  -0.859 [0.06]***  28  0.4328
Argentina  -0.396 [0.083]***  34  0.1896 Kyrgyz Republic  -0.669 [0.245]**  11  0.3358
Aruba  -1.216 [0.270]***  11  0.6406 Lesotho  -0.369 [0.159]**  29  0.1855
Australia  -0.333 [0.144]**  34  0.1534 Liberia  -0.71 [0.344]*  8  0.2223
Austria  -0.342 [0.196]*  34  0.1659 Libya  -0.764 [0.27]***  24  0.37
Bahamas, The  -0.422 [0.198]**  27  0.2768 Luxembourg  -1.235 [0.31]***  9  0.6728
Bahrain, Kingdom of  -0.543 [0.167]***  23  0.2777 Macedonia, FYR  -1.024 [0.426]*  8  0.4954
Bangladesh  -0.436 [0.144]***  28  0.2207 Madagascar  -0.397 [0.170]**  29  0.2189
Barbados  -0.236 [0.071]***  33  0.184 Malawi  -0.558 [0.19]***  25  0.2794
Benin  -0.87 [0.095]***  29  0.4344 Malaysia  -0.275 [0.115]**  33  0.114
Bolivia  -0.716 [0.234]***  34  0.3455 Maldives  -0.263 [0.117]**  24  0.2686
Botswana  -0.371 [0.158]**  28  0.1934 Mali  -0.684 [0.278]**  28  0.3379
Brazil  -0.214 [0.093]**  34  0.0841 Malta  -0.249 [0.106]**  33  0.1074
Bulgaria  -0.515 [0.189]**  24  0.2707 Mauritius  -0.514 [0.16]***  24  0.3008
Burkina Faso  -0.449 [0.228]*  21  0.2525 Mexico  -0.413 [0.15]***  34  0.2041
Burundi  -1.153 [0.215]***  18  0.5653 Mongolia  -0.512 [0.244]*  11  0.2986
Cambodia  -0.845 [0.141]***  12  0.4238 Morocco  -0.2 [0.115]*  34  0.0936
Cameroon  -0.837 [0.358]**  18  0.3319 Mozambique  -0.41 [0.151]**  24  0.2075
Canada  -0.194 [0.107]*  34  0.0816 Nepal  -0.312 [0.121]**  28  0.1609
Cape Verde  -0.25 [0.121]*  17  0.1713 New Zealand  -0.498 [0.14]***  34  0.2497
Central African Rep.  -1.015 [0.237]***  17  0.5007 Niger  -0.593 [0.19]***  29  0.3091
Chad  -0.52 [0.193]**  17  0.2594 Nigeria  -0.615 [0.16]***  27  0.2834
Chile  -0.447 [0.117]***  34  0.2108 Norway  -0.118 [0.090]  34  0.0428
China  -0.506 [0.152]***  22  0.2379 Oman  -0.676 [0.15]***  29  0.3454
Hong Kong  -0.506 [0.173]**  6  0.3946 Pakistan  -0.347 [0.145]**  34  0.1785
Colombia  -0.361 [0.136]**  34  0.1842 Panama  -0.4 [0.192]**  27  0.1984
Comoros  -0.604 [0.150]***  15  0.302 Papua New Guinea  -0.276 [0.122]**  25  0.1239
Congo, Republic of  -0.629 [0.137]***  25  0.3085 Paraguay  -0.334 [0.157]**  34  0.1621
Costa Rica  -0.329 [0.103]***  34  0.1602 Peru  -0.533 [0.19]***  34  0.2844
Côte d'Ivoire  -0.272 [0.117]**  34  0.1252 Philippines  -0.285 [0.123]**  34  0.1364
Croatia  -0.714 [0.298]**  11  0.4914 Poland  -0.717 [0.23]***  19  0.3541
Cyprus  -0.404 [0.124]***  28  0.2039 Portugal  -0.325 [0.09]***  32  0.1774
Czech Republic  -0.626 [0.184]***  11  0.4961 Rwanda  -0.887 [0.23]***  28  0.4664
Denmark  -0.142 [0.072]*  34  0.066 Samoa  -0.402 [0.212]*  21  0.2103
Dominica  -0.658 [0.308]**  25  0.3384 Saudi Arabia  -0.225 [0.101]**  34  0.1048
Dominican Republic  -0.477 [0.232]**  34  0.1703 Seychelles  -0.47 [0.14]***  28  0.23
Ecuador  -0.73 [0.185]***  34  0.3629 Sierra Leone  -0.619 [0.232]**  27  0.3095
El Salvador  -0.917 [0.196]***  34  0.47 Slovenia  -0.702 [0.12]***  12  0.5682
Eritrea  -0.42 [0.133]**  8  0.3374 Solomon Islands  -0.601 [0.20]***  24  0.3213
Ethiopia  -0.818 [0.225]***  23  0.3456 Somalia  -0.837 [0.20]***  12  0.456
Euro Area  -0.732 [0.263]**  6  0.3507 South Africa  -0.434 [0.165]**  34  0.2458
Fiji  -0.537 [0.145]***  20  0.2653 Spain  -0.247 [0.118]**  34  0.1023
France  -0.346 [0.132]**  34  0.1711 Sri Lanka  -0.47 [0.14]***  34  0.2363
Gabon  -0.435 [0.140]***  25  0.2133 St. Kitts and Nevis  -0.456 [0.167]**  22  0.209
Gambia, The  -0.331 [0.132]**  19  0.2128 St. Lucia  -0.43 [0.175]**  23  0.2742  43
Georgia  -1.051 [0.115]***  7  0.8795 St. Vincent & Gren.  -0.56 [0.14]***  24  0.3311
Ghana  -0.585 [0.165]***  29  0.3038 Sudan  -0.359 [0.129]**  27  0.1894
Grenada  -0.317 [0.160]*  25  0.1633 Suriname  -0.642 [0.16]***  27  0.3163
Guatemala  -0.627 [0.165]***  34  0.3334 Swaziland  -0.216 [0.083]**  30  0.1343
Guinea  -1.033 [0.280]***  18  0.5167 Syria  -0.527 [0.13]***  34  0.268
Guinea-Bissau  -0.125 [0.132]  17  0.034 Thailand  -0.198 [0.05]***  34  0.0907
Guyana  -0.297 [0.096]***  20  0.1822 Togo  -0.838 [0.20]***  29  0.6201
Haiti  -0.282 [0.126]**  32  0.153 Tonga  -1.004 [0.25]***  19  0.5141
Honduras  -0.586 [0.163]***  30  0.2968 Trinidad & Tobago  -0.382 [0.11]***  33  0.2019
Hungary  -0.385 [0.225]  22  0.1799 Tunisia  -0.407 [0.14]***  34  0.1996
Iceland  -0.722 [0.153]***  34  0.3515 Turkey  -0.764 [0.18]***  34  0.3605
India  -0.189 [0.108]*  33  0.0736 Uganda  -0.372 [0.194]*  24  0.1863
Indonesia  -0.358 [0.126]***  34  0.1789 United Kingdom  -0.237 [0.101]**  34  0.1315
Iran, I.R. of  -0.992 [0.214]***  21  0.5216 United States  -0.008 [0.070]  34  0.0004
Israel  -0.403 [0.165]**  34  0.2148 Uruguay  -0.494 [0.13]***  34  0.2462
Italy  -0.425 [0.171]**  34  0.2136 Vanuatu  -0.887 [0.14]***  21  0.4174
Jamaica  -0.507 [0.142]***  34  0.2612 Venezuela  -0.656 [0.13]***  34  0.3164
Japan  -0.222 [0.090]**  34  0.1013 Vietnam  -0.499 [0.218]*  6  0.409
Jordan  -0.586 [0.158]***  34  0.2926 Zambia  -0.926 [0.18]***  16  0.4478
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   44
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Figure 1 



















β β − = ;  Non-liquidated deposits are paid return 
f r .  Any non used reserves yield return  f r . 
End of period 1: 
Liquidity shock materializes; an adverse shock  0 ; < δ δ  induces deposit drop 
of  1 () lH δ μ − .   Æ  Reserves  1 R  are used to finance any liquidity shock and to 
hire non-traded specific input z (at 1 p ).   Costly liquidation of capital from 1 K
to  1 1 1; K K K ≤  would boost liquidity by  0 ); 1 /( ] [ 1 1 ≥ + − θ θ K K . 
Beginning of period 1: 
Entrepreneurs with initial wealth 1 H , subject to collateral constraint μ, use 
bank financing 1 H μ .   The combined liquidity  1 ) 1 ( H μ +  finances 
investment  1 K  and hoarding reserves,  1 R ,  1 1 1 ) 1 ( R K H + = + μ .   47
Figure 2 
Volatility and planned investment 
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The simulation corresponds to the case where  0.5; 1; 1; 1. lH β μ = == =  
 
Figure 3 
Volatility and relative expected output 
   
 
The simulation corresponds to the case where  2 . 0 = θ   0.5; 1; 1; 1. lH β μ = == =   The bold 
curve corresponds to no liquidation and optimal precautionary demand for reserves, the solid 
curve corresponds to zero precautionary demand, where all the adjustment is made by 
liquidation. 
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Table 1: REER vs. Terms of Trade Shocks and Mitigation through Reserve Accumulation 
Dependent  
Variable: Log REER  All  Developing  Industrial  Manufactures 
Natural 
 Resources  LATAM  ASIA 
Log Terms of Trade shock  1.802*** 1.836***  0.95  0.442  4.376***  1.642**  2.269** 
  [0.244] [0.255]  [0.594] [2.077]  [0.779]  [0.802] [1.104] 
Log TOT*Reserves  -3.873***  -3.937***  -1.603 12.269  -10.676 -0.537 -4.672** 
  [0.746] [0.766]  [4.607] [23.668]  [7.013]  [9.164] [2.280] 
Observations  1863  1260 603 271  253  343 202 
R-Squared  0.4549 0.4367  0.5947 0.4066  0.6162  0.3903 0.2161 
Years  1970-2004 1970-2004  1970-2004  1970-2004 1970-2004  1980-2004 1970-2004 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 2: REER vs. Lagged Terms of Trade Shocks and Mitigation through Reserve 
Accumulation 
Dependent  
Variable: Log REER  All  Developing  Industrial  Manufactures 
Natural 
 Resources  LATAM  ASIA 
Lagged Log TOT shock  1.773***  1.806*** 0.784 0.23  4.362***  1.205 1.762 
  [0.278] [0.289]  [0.581] [1.895]  [0.759]  [0.827] [1.103] 
Lagged Log TOT*RES  -3.557***  -3.633***  0.988 6.282  -11.528*  4.654 -4.024* 
  [0.887] [0.910]  [4.573] [21.767]  [6.473]  [10.059]  [2.388] 
Observations  1852  1263  589 262  252  343 201 
R-Squared  0.4465 0.4302  0.5947 0.4027  0.6165  0.3898 0.2047 
Years  1970-2004 1970-2004  1970-2004  1970-2004 1970-2004  1980-2004 1970-2004 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 





Trade   
Terms of  







Argentina  44.994 [6.597]***  -793.738  [113.969]*** 25  0.5594  -0.76438  -27.4739  0.0099 
Chile  8.436 [1.561]***  -50.188  [13.080]*** 23  0.6338  -1.46511  -0.97332  0.0517 
Ecuador  7.158 [1.322]***  -46.25  [21.816]** 23  0.66  3.386239  5.400608  0.0573 
Mexico  3.841 [2.048]*  -177.211  [71.729]**  23 0.1901  -5.69239  -9.71975 0.0360 
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D(CU/GDP) Lag(CU/GDP) SE  Obs.  R-squared 
All Sample  All  -0.437***  [0.026]  4053 0.2548 
1970-2004 Developing  -0.441***  [0.027]  3346 0.2608 
 OECD  -0.260***  [0.036]  707 0.2315 
 MA  -0.250***  [0.056]  273 0.3655 
 NR  -0.362***  [0.049]  391 0.4182 
 LATAM  -0.432***  [0.088]  594 0.3082 
 ASIA  -0.217***  [0.063]  298 0.3812 
1980-1992 All  -0.544***  [0.041]  1661 0.3316 
 Developing  -0.546***  [0.042]  1394 0.3336 
 OECD  -0.433***  [0.057]  267 0.2228 
 LATAM  -0.523***  [0.091]  234 0.3395 
 ASIA  -0.248***  [0.067]  114 0.1626 
1993-2004 All  -0.563***  [0.046]  1708 0.3421 
 Developing  -0.568***  [0.047]  1445 0.3443 
 OECD  -0.347***  [0.059]  263 0.2224 
 LATAM  -0.507***  [0.059]  216 0.3963 
 ASIA  -0.315***  [0.087]  112 0.166 
Indebtedness DEBT1  -0.435***  [0.047]  1016 0.2737 
 DEBT2  -0.512***  [0.040]  930 0.3515 
 DEBT3  -0.412***  [0.057]  999 0.2449 
Income Level  INCOME1  -0.413***  [0.044]  1137 0.2679 
 INCOME2  -0.495***  [0.056]  1105 0.3302 
 INCOME3  -0.496***  [0.057]  844 0.2809 
 INCOME4  -0.315***  [0.050]  961 0.224 
 
Table 5: Estimated β for selective countries* 
 
Name  β  SE Observations  R-squared 
Argentina -0.396 [0.083]***  34  0.1896
Brazil -0.214 [0.093]**  34  0.0841
Chile -0.447 [0.117]***  34  0.2108
Costa Rica  -0.329 [0.103]***  34  0.1602
Dominican Republic  -0.477 [0.232]**  34  0.1703
Ecuador -0.73 [0.185]***  34  0.3629
El Salvador  -0.917 [0.196]***  34  0.47
Haiti -0.282 [0.126]**  32  0.153
Honduras -0.586 [0.163]***  30  0.2968
Mexico -0.413 [0.149]***  34  0.2041
Uruguay -0.494 [0.128]***  34  0.2462
Venezuela -0.656 [0.129]***  34  0.3164
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Univariate Regressions 
Dependent Variable :Alpha  ALL  Non OECD 
RESERVES  0.068 0.183 
  [0.110] [0.100]* 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE VOLATILITY  -0.056 0.058 
  [0.247] [0.240] 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION  0.142 -0.042 
  [0.110] [0.113] 
TERMS OF TRADE  0.058 0.116 
  [0.083] [0.085] 
GDP GROWTH  1.701 2.119 
  [0.635]*** [0.639]*** 
% SHARE OF COMMODITIES  -0.415 -0.311 
  [0.096]*** [0.102]*** 
INLFATION  -0.017 0.009 
 [0.044]  [0.044] 
Robust standard errors in brackets 





Table 7: Multivariate Regression 
 
Alpha ALL  Non  Oecd 
Reserves  0.058 0.192 
  [0.089] [0.082]** 
Inflation  -0.101 -0.072 
  [0.042]** [0.043]* 
NE Volatility  0.566 0.545 
  [0.303]* [0.294]* 
TOT  0.177 0.195 
  [0.088]** [0.098]* 
Financial Int  0.298 0.076 
  [0.114]** [0.127] 
Manufactures  0.784 0.628 
  [0.212]*** [0.225]*** 
Observations  94 80 
R-squared  0.2084 0.1618 
 
 
 